Washington International Law Journal
Volume 26

Number 2

4-1-2017

Can the Japanese Supreme Court Overcome the Political
Question Hurdle?
Po Liang Chen
Jordan T. Wada

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Po L. Chen & Jordan T. Wada, Comment, Can the Japanese Supreme Court Overcome the Political
Question Hurdle?, 26 Wash. Int’l L.J. 349 (2017).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol26/iss2/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of
UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Compilation © 2017 Washington International Law Journal Association

CAN THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT OVERCOME
THE POLITICAL QUESTION HURDLE?
Po Liang Chen & Jordan T. Wada
Abstract:
In 1947, a new Japanese Constitution (“Kenpō”) was born and its
pacifist ideal was embodied in Article 9. Meanwhile, judicial review was transplanted,
mainly from the United States (“U.S.”), into Japan. While the U.S. Supreme Court has
narrowed its political question doctrine since Baker v. Carr in 1962, Japan developed its
constitutional avoidance and political question doctrine in part to avoid deciding the
merits of Article 9 disputes, including the legitimacy of Japan’s Self-Defense Force, the
Security Treaty between the US and Japan, and the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan.
The Japanese Supreme Court (“SCJ”) adopted a deferential temperament to maintain
stability with the political branches, thereby abdicating an effective means of settling
critical disputes by routinely allowing executive interpretations of the Kenpō to stand
unchallenged. Under the auspices of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, an executive
reinterpretation of Article 9 in July of 2014 sparked intense debate over the Kenpō’s
fundamental principle of pacifism; it nearly divided Japan. In order to stimulate
constitutional checks and balances, SCJ should seize the role of authoritative interpreter
of the Kenpō. An important step in this direction can be accomplished by reexamining
the unique text and history of the Kenpō and the development of political question
doctrine in Japan. As the U.S. acted as Japan’s transplant donor of judicial review, the
development of the U.S. political question doctrine could offer a model for SCJ to
reconsider the weight of textual and historical considerations. We recommend that SCJ
restate and clarify its political question doctrine using the development of the U.S.
political question doctrine as a model. Further, agreeing to hear an Article 9 case will
allow SCJ to play an active role in furtherance of a constructive dialogue between the
government and the people to form a new consensus on its national security strategies
and move Japan forward.

INTRODUCTION
In the wake of World War II, the current Constitution of Japan (the
“Kenpō”) was enacted under unusual circumstances, coordinately drafted by
United States (“U.S.”) and Japanese legal experts.1 The Kenpō is known as
the pacifist Constitution and this principle is expressed substantively in the
Kenpō’s Preamble and in Article 9. 2 Article 9, Paragraph 1, provides, “the
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1
KENZO TAKAYANAGI ET AL., NIHON-KOKU KENPŌ SEITEI NO KATEI [PROCESS OF ENACTMENT OF
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] II, 13 (1972).
2
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], preamble (Japan) (providing: “We, the Japanese
people, . . . resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of
government . . . We . . . desire peace for all time . . . and we have determined to preserve our security and
existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.”).
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Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” 3
Article 9, Paragraph 2, the “War Potential Clause,” declares, “[i]n order to
accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as
well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”4
Since the Kenpō’s enactment, the War Potential Clause has invariably
represented the most controversial issue in Japanese politics. 5 Given the
ambiguity in the War Potential Clause’s language, concern over the
constitutionality of Japan’s military body—the Self-Defense Force
(“SDF”)—abounds.6 Similar controversies regarding The Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan7 (“Anpo”)
and the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan compounded. 8 Early disputes over
the SDF, Anpo, and the stationing of U.S. forces comprise three of the most
prominent factors shaping the field of Japanese politics, and planted seeds of
dynamic social movements springing up since the 1950s.9
On July 1, 2014, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Cabinet issued
an executive reinterpretation of Article 9 (“2014 reinterpretation”).10 The
3

KENPŌ art. 9, para. 1.
Id. at art. 9, para. 2 (“In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will
not be recognized.”). The first clause is known as the “war potential clause.”
5
David S. Law, The Myth of the Imposed Constitution, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONS 245 (Dennis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013).
6
Shigenori Matsui, Why is the Japanese Supreme Court so Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV.
1375, 1387 (2011) (describing SCJ’s major decision regarding the SDF’s constitutionality, the Sunagawa
Case) [hereinafter Matsui].
7
The Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan was first signed on September 8 1951,
becoming effective on April 28 1952, the Security Treaty between The United States and Japan, U.S.Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3329; The Security Treaty was substantially amended in January 1960 by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in Washington, and retitled the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, U.S.-Japan,
Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632; Nihonkoku to amerika gasshūkoku to no aida no sōgo hoshō oyobi anzen
hoshō jōyaku, Treaty No. 6 of 1960, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/namerica/us/q&a/ref/1.html. The most
controversial provisions are Article 5 Section 1, reading: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack
against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace
and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
provisions and processes”; and Article 6 Section 1: “For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan
and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is
granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.”
8
SHINICHI YAMAMURO, KENPŌ 9 JŌ NO SHISO SUIMYAKU [THE HISTORICAL THOUGHTS OF KENPŌ
ARTICLE 9] (2007).
9
Takashi Yamada, Zainichibeigun kichi to sunakawa jiken [The US base in Japan and Sunagawa
Incident], 60 Horitsu Semina 717, (2014).
10
Kuni no sonritsu o mattou shi, kokumin o mamoru tameno kireme no nai anzen hosho hosei no
seibi ni tsuite [Regarding Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and
4
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government claimed the basic rationale remained the same, but many
believed this reinterpretation 11 substantially shifted the meaning of Article
9’s War Potential Clause away from its previous interpretation allowing only
individual self-defense 12 to include collective self-defense. 13 This 2014
reinterpretation shook the roots of the Kenpō and its pacifist principle. 14
Although the 2014 reinterpretation will not produce a practical impact until
potential new legislation enables the SDF to undertake acts and redefine its
relationship with U.S. forces, the reinterpretation was criticized as a
significant departure from longstanding policy. 15
Most Japanese
constitutional scholars denounced the 2014 reinterpretation as
unconstitutional, criticizing the Cabinet for bypassing the process of
amending the Kenpō.16 Thereafter, dormant social movements reawakened,
summoning thousands of citizens to the streets, and bringing the issues of
the constitutional legitimacy of the SDF, Anpo, and stationing of U.S. forces
back into the political spotlight. 17 A deadlock between the hard-liner
Cabinet and the pacifist people generated a constitutional crisis.18
Protect Its People], National Security Committee & Cabinet Decision, July 1, 2014, translated in Cabinet
Secretariat’s website, at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/anpohosei_eng.pdf.
11
Keigo Komamura, 7. 1 Kakugi kettei shudantekijieiken koshi no gentei-teki yonin – Nihon-gata
bunpo bun tochi no rekishi-teki shirimetsuretsu [Cabinet decision on July 1st, an acceptance of the right to
collective self-defense exercise – The historic incoherent with Japanese rule of law], 17 QUARTERLY
JURIST 100, 105 (2016) [hereinafter Keigo Komamura].
12
See Director General of CLB, Tatsuo Sato’s answer at Cabinet Committee of House of
Representatives, Naikaku in kaigiroku [Cabinet Committee Minutes, House of Representatives], 19th Diet
Session, No. 20, 2 (Apr. 6, 1954); Director General of CLB, Ichiro Yoshikuni’s answer in the Budget
Committee of the House of Councilors, Nov. 13, 1972, Sangiin Yosan Iin Kaigiroku [Budget Committee of
House of Councilors Minutes], 70th Diet Session, No. 5, at 2 (Nov. 13, 1972).
13
Previously, the SDF could employ self-defense only when Japan was attacked (individual selfdefense). The 2014 reinterpretation authorizes the Japanese government to mobilize the SDF to defend an
ally, the U.S., “where an attack occurs against the units of the United States armed forces currently engaged
in activities which contribute to the defense of Japan and such situation escalates into an armed attack
depending on its circumstances.” TAKASHI YAMADA, supra note 10; M ASAHIRO SAKATA, KENPŌ 9-JŌ TO
ANPO HŌSEI [KENPŌ ARTICLE 9 AND ANPO LEGAL SYSTEM] 6 (2016).
14
Yasuo Hasebe, Shudantekijieiken koshi yonin-ron no mondaiten [The problem of the right to
collective self-defense], in 65 LIBERTY & JUSTICE (9) 8 (Sept. 2014); Toshiyuki Munesue, Shudantekijieiken
fūkei – 9-jō, zenbun, 13-jō [The right to collective self-defense landscape - Article 9, the preamble, Article
13], Horitsu Jiho, Vol. 87 No. 12, 33 (Nov. 2015).
15
Keigo Komamura, supra note 11.
16
Yasuo Hasebe, supra note 14; Keigo Komamura, supra note 11; MASAHIRO SAKATA, M ASAHIRO
SAKATA, supra note 13, at 1; Asaho Mizushima, Shūdantekijieiken kōshi ga kenpō-jō mitomerarenai riyū
[The Reason collective self-defense rights are not compatible with KENPŌ], in SHŪDANTEKIJIEIKEN NO NANI
GA MONDAI KA: KAISHAKU KAIKEN HIHAN 119 (Yasuhiro Okudaira & Jiro Yamaguchi eds. 2014);
TOSHIHIRO YAMAUCHI, ANZEN HOSHŌ' HŌSEI TO KAIKEN O TOU [THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY LAW AND
KENPŌ AMENDMENT] 114 (2015).
17
Lisa Torio, Japan Is Scrapping Its Pacifist Constitution, Despite Massive Public Opposition, THE
NATION (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/japan-is-scrapping-its-pacifist-constitution-
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At this critical moment of constitutional crisis, one of several serious
obstacles the Supreme Court of Japan (“SCJ”) must overcome to serve as
Japan’s court of last resort is its own political question doctrine. 19 SCJ
jurisprudence is fairly characterized as exhibiting judicial restraint, often
leaving the executive branch as the final interpreter of the Kenpō in
practice.20 Currently, for both political and legal reasons, no defined route
for judicial review is established for Article 9 challenges.21 When hearing
disputes related to defense or foreign policy, especially concerning Anpo and
stationing of U.S. forces, SCJ justices and sitting in the interior court judges
have employed the concept of Tochi Koi Ron (“political question
doctrine”),22 a theory to the effect that certain acts of the Diet done in the
name of the State or of the government are not subject to the power of
judicial review.23 This theory is influenced by the U.S. political question
doctrine24 and acts as one legal barrier preventing the Court from rendering a
substantive opinion.25 Though Article 81 of the Kenpō grants the Court full
judicial review power, SCJ has placed little emphasis on this text, and shies
away from the Kenpō’s framers’ insistence on full judicial review.

despite-massive-public-opposition/; Justin McCurry, New generation of Japanese anti-war protesters
challenge
Abe,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
16,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/16/japanese-anti-war-protesters-challenge-shinzo-abe.
18
Yasuo Hasebe, supra note 14; Keigo Komamura, supra note 11; McCurry, supra note 17.
19
KENPŌ, art. 81, para. 1 (“The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine
the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.”).
20
Shigenori Matsui, supra note 6, at 1375 (explaining SCJ’s reluctance to overturn laws or
government acts).
21
KENPŌ, art. 81, para. 1; See David S. Law, Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan?, 88 W ASH.
U. L. REV. 1425, 1428–1448 (2011) (exploring, inter alia, cultural explanations, the status of judges as
second-class bureaucrats, and political factors as barriers to judicial review).
22
The concept of acte de gouvernement was initially introduced into Japan from France in 1938,
interpreted as Tochi Koi Ron [統治行為論]. However, after WWII, the concept of Tochi Koi Ron was
substantially transformed and influenced by the political question doctrine in the U.S. The term Tochi Koi
Ron was also referred to as Seijimondai (political question) [政治問題]. See Yasuhiro Okudaira, Tochi koi
riron no hihanteki kosatsu [A critical view on the political question doctrine], 45 HORITSU JIHO No.10, 80
(1973) [hereinafter Yasuhiro Okudaira]; Setsu Kobayashi, Amerikagasshūkoku ni okeru seijimondai ni
kansuru hanrei no dōkō to jittai [The precedent of political question doctrine in the U.S. and its trends], 53
HOGAKU KENKYU (3) 381, 382 (1980) [hereinafter Setsu Kobayashi]; AKIRA OSUGA, ET AL., KENPŌ JITEN
[DICTIONARY OF THE CONSTITUTION] 359 (2001) [hereinafter KENPŌ JITEN].
23
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, A no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan) (Katsumi Tarumi J., concurring) (A ruling on the constitutionality of
stationing of U.S. forces in Japan and 1952 United States-Japan Security Treaty).
24
Setsu Kobayashi, supra note 22, at 381–82.
25
Id. (since 1947, SCJ has developed its constitutional avoidance and political question doctrine to
avoid deciding the merits of disputes related to Article 9, including the legitimacy of the Self-Defense
Force, the Security Treaty between the US and Japan, and the stationing of U.S. Forces).
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Clarifying the political question doctrine in light of U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence could remove one major hurdle that prevents SCJ from
granting a merits hearing and settling the current constitutional crisis.
Reexamining the meaning of political questions and contemplating its wane
in the U.S. Supreme Court could provide SCJ with a jurisprudential basis to
play a more effective role in interpreting the Kenpō. 26 Part I of this
comment introduces the historical transplant of judicial review and the
political question doctrine into Japan. Part II provides an overview of
judicial review and the political question doctrine in the U.S., as a
foundation for comparison. Part III recommends steps SCJ could take to
clarify and restate its political question doctrine, and how it might use the
U.S. political question doctrine’s development from Baker v. Carr (1962) to
Zivotofsky v. Clinton (2012) as an example when navigating a challenge to
the 2014 reinterpretation. We conclude that overcoming the political
question doctrine will help bring SCJ one step closer to the role of final
interpreter of the Kenpō to provide clear guidance and produce a
constructive dialogue among the government, scholars, and the people.
I.

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE IN JAPAN

The political question doctrine is difficult to distill because it is
intertwined with debates regarding the boundary of judicial review and the
proper function of the judicial branch. Therefore, before reaching the
political question doctrine in Japan, it will prove useful to review the
historical context wherein judicial review was transplanted from the U.S.
into Japan. This will provide a backdrop to examine the jurisprudential
evolution of the political question doctrine in Japan, especially in SCJ over
the past seventy years.
A.

The Establishment of SCJ and Judicial Review in 1947

The establishment of Japanese judicial review is swaddled in an
unusual history. On August 14, 1945, the Empire of Japan surrendered to
the United Allies and the U.S. appointed General Douglas MacArthur
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (“SCAP”), marking the end of
World War II. 27 Under Allied and SCAP supervision, Japanese Prime
26

Yasuhiro Okudaira, supra note 22, at 80.
The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center, Japan: Interpretations of Article 9 of
the Constitution, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/interpretations-article9.php; GENERAL
STAFF OF GENERAL DOUGLAS M ACARTHUR, REPORT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR - MACARTHUR IN J APAN:
27
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Minister Kijuro Shidehara, appointed Joji Matsumoto chairman of the
Constitution Research Committee (“Matsumoto Committee”) to amend
Japan’s Meiji Constitution. 28 The Matsumoto Committee drafted two
versions of its constitutional amendment. 29 No record exists of any
Matsumoto Committee member proposing judicial review.
General
MacArthur was unsatisfied with the Matsumoto Committee’s failure to
revive democratic tendencies and respect fundamental rights in its proposal;
he directed the Government Section (“GS”)30 to secretly begin a new draft
(the “MacArthur proposal”).31 On February 13, 1946, the SCAP formally
rejected the Matsumoto Committee proposal and presented the until-thenclandestine MacArthur proposal. 32 Surprising the Japanese government,
Article 7333 of the MacArthur proposal included a limited version of judicial
review, reading:
The Supreme Court is the court of last resort. Where the
determination of the constitutionality of any law, order,
regulation or official act is in question, the judgment of the
Supreme Court in all cases arising under or involving Chapter
III [rights of the people] of this Constitution is final; in all other
cases where determination of the constitutionality of any law,
ordinance, regulation or official act is in question, the judgment
of the Court is subject to review by the Diet.34
After reviewing and deliberating over the MacArthur proposal, the Japanese
government embraced the idea of full judicial review and insisted on
removing 35 the MacArthur proposal language that would have limited
judicial review. 36 During negotiations between the GS and Japanese
THE
OCCUPATION:
MILITARY PHASE: VOLUME I SUPPLEMENT 67 (Washington: GPO, 1966), http://www.history.army.mil/boo
ks/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1%20Sup/Index.htm.
28
KENZO TAKAYANAGI ET AL., NIHON-KOKU KENPŌ SEITEI NO KATEI [PROCESS OF ENACTMENT OF
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] II, 13 (1972) [hereinafter KENZO TAKAYANAGI II].
29
YASUHIRO OKUDAIRA, KENPŌ SAIBAN NO KANOSEI [THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW] 99–115
(1995).
30
The Government Section of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers.
31
KENZO TAKAYANAGI ET AL., NIHON-KOKU KENPŌ SEITEI NO KATEI [PROCESS OF ENACTMENT OF
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] I, 40 (1972) [hereinafter KENZO TAKAYANAGI I].
32
KENZO TAKAYANAGI II, supra note 28, at 55.
33
YASUHIRO OKUDAIRA, KENPŌ SAIBAN NO KANOSEI [THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW], 97 (1995).
34
KENZO TAKAYANAGI II, supra note 28, at 242–245.
35
RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING THE NEW
JAPANESE STATE UNDER MACARTHUR 356 (2002).
36
KENZO TAKAYANAGI I, supra note 31, at 27, 32, 122, 186; KENZO TAKAYANAGI II, supra note 28,
at 242–245.
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government on March 4–5, 1946, the Japanese government emphasized the
importance of judicial independence and public reliance on the judicial
branch, rationales in contrast with the GS’s concern of judicial oligarchy.37
Thus, the March 6, 1946 draft of the constitution provides, “[t]he Supreme
Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality
of any law, order, regulation or official act,”–textually identical to Article 81
of the 1947 Kenpō, which is viewed as the origin of judicial review in
Japan.38 The March 6, 1946 draft was thereafter written in vernacular, and
ultimately came into effect on May 3, 1947 as the 1947 Kenpō.39 The birth
of judicial review in Japan emanates a duality. On one hand, it is clear that
judicial review was initiated as a legal transplant from the U.S. rather than
from Japanese enthusiasm. 40 On the other hand, at the Kenpō’s drafting,
compared to the McArthur proposal’s limited scope judicial review, the
framing Japanese scholars and officials all preferred full judicial review,
employing rationales of judicial independence and public reliance on the
judicial branch.41
Following the Kenpō’s enactment, SCJ first took office in August
1947. As with U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall in the
early 19th Century, the issue of drawing the boundary of judicial review
soon emerged. In response, the concept of Tochi Koi Ron43 was considered
and accepted by SCJ.44 Given that the U.S. acted as Japan’s main judicial
review donor, Japanese scholars and SCJ naturally noted the U.S. political
question doctrine among their influences. 45 Meanwhile, the weight of
42

37

KENZO TAKAYANAGI I, supra note 31, at 245.
YASUHIRO OKUDAIRA, supra note 29, at 112.
39
JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: J APAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 365–367 (1999).
40
Robert Ward, Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution, 50 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 980 (1957);
KENZO TAKAYANAGI I, supra note 31, at xxii (explaining “Dr. Matsumoto said he has been forced to accept
the ‘MacArthur Constitution’ only after a statement was made by the GHQ staff that ‘the person of the
Emperor could not be guaranteed.’”).
41
KENZO TAKAYANAGI II, supra note 28, at 242–245; MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 36.
42
Lawrence Repeta, Reserved Seats on Japan’s Supreme Court, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1713, 1713
(2011).
43
The concept of Tochi Koi Ron was substantially influenced by the political question doctrine in the
U.S. See supra note 22.
44
Id.; Hiroshi Kaneko, Tochi koi [The political question doctrine], 131 JURIST 39, 40 (1957); Saikō
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, Shō 34 (a) no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ S AIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ]
3225 (Japan) (Hachiro Fujita, J., & Toshio Irie, J., concurring).
45
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec 16, 1959, A no.710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan) (Hachiro Fujita, J., & Toshio Irie, J., concurring) (“[T]here are
divergent views regarding the origin, the basis for the theory, or the scope of the acts which would fall
within the purview of such restriction, such is a well established precedent and an accepted academic
38
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Article 81’s text and unusual history diminished in SCJ’s political questions
case law.46
B.

The Sunagawa Case: Japan’s Leading Precedent on the
Political Question Doctrine

Soon after the enactment of the 1947 Kenpō, communism in Far East
Asia threatened the security of Japan.47 The U.S. government and Japanese
ruling elites agreed this necessitated the establishment of the Japanese SelfDefense Force and retention of U.S. forces for Japan to deter potential armed
attacks or internal riots.48 As a result of this decision, SCJ had to face three
main types of constitutional challenges brought under the Kenpō’s Article 9,
Paragraph 2, War Potential Clause: challenges to the SDF, to Anpo, and to
the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.
For disputes concerning the legitimacy of SDF, SCJ seemed to fall
under the influence of the constitutional avoidance principles stated in the
1936 U.S. Supreme Court case Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,49
and have not granted a merits hearing on the issue of the SDF’s
constitutionality. SCJ first faced a War Potential Clause challenge in the
National Police Reserve Case (concerning the origin and predecessor of the
SDF), filed by Japan’s Socialist Party in 1952.50 SCJ dismissed the case and
held “it could not determine the constitutionality of a law or an official act in
the abstract and in the absence of any concrete legal dispute.”51
In contrast to the constitutional avoidance analysis deployed on the issue
of the legitimacy of SDF, SCJ adopted the political question doctrine in
disputes involving Anpo and the stationing of U.S. forces.52 SCJ initially

theory in the European and American countries, as may be perceived from such expressions
as. . . ‘political question’, appearing in American cases.”).
46
SETSU KOBAYASHI, SEIJIMONDAI NO HŌRI [THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE] 108 (1988).
47
The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center, Japan: Interpretations of Article 9 of
the Constitution, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/interpretations-article9.php.
48
Id.
49
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); MIYOKO TSUJIMURA, KENPŌ
[CONSTITUTION] 511, 512 (2000).
50
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 8, 1952, Volume 6, Issue 9 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ
[MINSHŪ] 783 (Japan).
51
Id.; see also SETSU KOBAYASHI, supra note 46.
52
MOTOAKI HATAKE, KENKYŪ TO GIRON NO SAIZENSEN [KENPŌ ARTICLE 9 - FRONTIERS OF
RESEARCH AND DISCUSSION], 94-95 (2006).
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adopted the political question doctrine in the 1959 Sunagawa Case. 53
Japanese scholars have achieved consensus that the Sunagawa Case
concerned political questions jurisprudence, and they continue to debate how
far its political questions implications extend.54 In the Sunagawa Case, SCJ
invoked what it understood as the spirit of the political question doctrine to
avoid the political controversy of whether Anpo and retaining U.S. forces in
Japan violated the War Potential Clause.55 Thereafter, the political question
doctrine became a legal barrier to further Article 9 challenges. 56
In autumn of 1957, seven demonstrators protesting the expansion of a
military base in the town of Sunagawa were charged with trespassing on a
U.S. air base.57 Their protest violated Article 2 of the Special Criminal Law,
criminalizing trespasses against military bases stationing U.S. armed forces.
58
The case soon gained public attention because the Special Criminal Law
raised an Article 9 issue: whether the authoritative basis of the Special
Criminal Law, the 1952 United States-Japan Security Treaty, which allowed
the stationing of U.S. forces, violated the War Potential Clause. 59 The
Tokyo District Court acquitted the protesters on March 30, 1959, holding the
1952 United States-Japan Security Treaty’s allowance of U.S. military
personnel in Japan violated Article 9, Paragraph 2. 60 The Tokyo District
53
The term “political question doctrine” was not formally referred to in the judicial opinion.
However, the spirit of the political question doctrine is apparent. See Yasuo Hasebe, Constitutional
Borrowing and Political Theory, INTL. J. OF CONST. L. 224, 226 (2003),
54
KISABURO YOKOTA, IKEN SHINSA [THE JUDICIAL REVIEW] 83 (1968); SETSU KOBAYASHI, supra not
e 46, at 139–41; AKIRA OSUGA, supra note 22, at 359–60.
55
CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 225 (2003);
NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPŌ SOSHO GENDAI-TEKI TENKAI [THE MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] 129, 132 (1981); KISABURO YOKOTA, IKEN SHINSA supra note 54; See
Yasuhiro Okudaira, supra note 22, at 75; Obayashi Keigo, Seijimondai no hōri no yukue [The Future of
Political Question Doctrine], 87 Hōgaku Kenkyū No. 2, 198; Masaomi Kimizuka, Tochi Koi-Ron Saikō —
Aru Ga Nai [Reconsidering Political Question Doctrine —To Be or Not to Be], 22 YOKOHAMA L. REV. 33
(2013); AKIRA OSUGA, supra note 22, at 55; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, A no.710, 13 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan). Id.
56
Tsunemasa Arikawa, Hōri Saikōsai tōchikōi [The Principle of Law, The Supreme Court, and
Political Question], 87 HORITSU JIHO No. 5, 4 (2015); Yasuo Hasebe, Sunakawa jiken hanketsu ni okeru
tōchi kōi-ron [The Political Question Doctrine in Sunagawa Case], 87 HORITSU JIHO No. 5, 44 (2015).
57
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, A no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan).
58
Nipponkoku to Amerikagasshūkoku to no ma no anzen hoshōjōyaku daisanjo ni motodzuku
gyosei kyōtei ni tomonau keiji tokubetsu-ho [Special Criminal Act due to the security treaty Administrative
Agreement between Japan and the United States of America under Article 3], Law No. 138 of 1952, art. 2
(Japan).
59
KENPŌ, art. 9, para. 2.
60
Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Mar. 30, 1959, Sho 32 (wa) no. 367, 368, 1 KAKYŪ
SAIBANSHO KEIJI SAIBAN REISŪ [KAKEISHŪ] 3, 776 (Japan). The District Court decision preceding the
Sunagawa Case was also called the “Date Decision,” named after presiding judge Akio Date. “Article 2 of
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Court’s decision churned up controversy over Article 9 and the undefined
boundary of judicial review. 61 Addressing the dispute, SCJ took the case
and overturned the district court, limiting the scope of judicial review on
political question grounds.62
The SCJ interpreted Article 9, Paragraph 2 as prohibiting the
maintenance of war potential over which Japan exercises the right of
command and supervision only, not the stationing of foreign armed forces in
Japan. 63 Moreover, SCJ raised the political question doctrine without
directly citing its name,64 declining to rule on the merits whether the SDF is
unconstitutional under Article 9. 65
The Sunagawa Case’s majority noted that the issue of whether the
stationing of U.S. armed forces under the 1952 United States-Japan Security
Treaty conflicts with Article 9 featured “an extremely high degree of
political consideration . . . there is a certain element of incompatibility in the
process of judicial determination of its constitutionality by a court of law
which has as its mission the exercise of the purely judicial function.”66 SCJ
further indicated, “legal determination as to whether the content of the treaty
is constitutional or not is . . . related to the high degree of political
consideration or discretionary power on the part of the Cabinet . . . and

the Special Criminal Law Enacted in Consequence of the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the
Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America is null and void, as it contradicts Article
31 of the Constitution on the premise that the stationing of the United States armed forces in Japan
contravenes the provisions of the first part of paragraph 2, Article 9 of the Constitution.”.
61
Id.
62
Declassified U.S. documents indicate SCJ Chief Justice Kotaro Tanaka conducted private
correspondence with senior U.S. diplomats in Tokyo before trial in the Sunagawa Case, raising judicial
independence and due process concerns. See REIKO FUKAWA & TOSHIKAZU SHINOHARA, SUNAKAWA
JIKEN TO TANAKA SAIKŌSAI CHOKAN AMERIKA KAIKIN BUNSHO GA AKIRAKA NI SHITA NIHON NO SHIHŌ
[SUNAGAWA INCIDENT AND THE CHIEF JUSTICE TANAKA – THE JAPANESE JUDICIAL SYSTEM FROM THE
PERSPECTIVES OF THE REVEALED AMERICAN CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT] 60–61 (2013).
63
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, A no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan).
64
At least one scholar viewed the Sunagawa Case as a discretion theory case, rather than as political
question doctrine case. See Kakudo Toyoji, Tochi Koi [Political Question Doctrine], 638 JURIST 172, 173
(1977).
65
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, A no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan); Motoaki Hatake, supra note 52, at 95; Katsutoshi Katami, Hō Saikōsai
tōchi [Law, Supreme Court, and Ruling], 87 HORITSU JIHO NO. 5, 50; NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPŌ 343
(Takahashi Kazuyuki rev. 6th ed. 2015).
66
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, A no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan).
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. . . the Diet.”67 The Court concluded judicial restraint was proper because
highly political considerations belong to the people.68
As for drawing the boundary of judicial review on issues with a high
degree of political consideration, SCJ held that the 1952 United States-Japan
Security Treaty and the stationing of U.S. forces were not “obviously
unconstitutional and void,” fell outside the scope of judicial review, and
must be left to the discretion of the executive and legislature. 69 Accordingly,
SCJ has “avoided ruling upon the merits of constitutional challenges to
Japan’s military activities and security arrangements under Article 9,” and
ruled that the Tokyo District Court exceeded the scope of judicial review. 70
In the Sunagawa Case, SCJ set a landmark for the political question
doctrine, straddling the competing ideas of judicial supremacy and the
avoidance of judicial oligarchy. The Court restricted judicial review of
Article 9 challenges to those concerning the 1952 United States-Japan
Security Treaty or the stationing of U.S. forces, and placed issues of “an
extremely high degree of political consideration” outside the scope of
Article 81’s judicial review power.71 For reviewable Article 9 issues (which
exclude the constitutionality of the SDF), SCJ declared a clear mistake rule,
deferring to the political branches so long as the act is “not obviously
unconstitutional and void.”72
C.

Evolution of the Political Question Doctrine After the
Sunagawa Case

After the Sunagawa Case, SCJ soon faced two questions: whether the
political question doctrine and its clear mistake rule would extend to other
disputes of high political consideration, and whether it would bind all future
Article 9 disputes. As for other highly political disputes, one year after the
Sunagawa Case, SCJ considered the issue of the procedure for dissolving
the Diet in the Tomabechi Case, setting political questions criteria distinct
67

Id.
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Tatsugoro Isozaki, Iwayuru tōchi kōi o kōtei suru gakusetsu no hihan [Criticism of Political
Question Doctrine], 31 HANDAIHŌGAKU 8 (1959); NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, supra note 55, at 119; Yasuo
Hasebe, supra note 56, at 44.
72
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, A no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan).
68
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from Sunagawa. 73 On August 28, 1952, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida
dissolved the house of representatives pursuant to Article 7 of the Kenpō.74
Representative Gizo Tomabechi challenged the dissolution and sued for his
unpaid salary. 75 In 1953, the Tokyo District Court held the dissolution
invalid because it was not made at a Cabinet meeting. 76 In 1954, the Tokyo
High Court reversed on appeal, ruling the Cabinet reached its decision in a
legal manner, but rejecting the political question doctrine.77
Representative Tomabechi appealed to SCJ. 78 As in the Sunagawa
Case, SCJ evoked the political question doctrine without directly naming
it.79 SCJ held that judicial review should be precluded from touching action
within the discretion of the political branches, including the Cabinet’s act of
dissolving the Diet. 80 The Court reasoned that this discretion should be
viewed as subject to political accountability, controlled ultimately by the
people.81 In the Tomabechi Case, although the spirit of the political question
doctrine was retained, SCJ used new rationales and distinguished it from the
Sunagawa Case in two ways. First, SCJ did not mention the “not obviously
unconstitutional and void” clear mistake rule. Second, SCJ emphasized the
rationales of separation of powers and political accountability to justify its
exercise of judicial restraint.
As to whether the Sunagawa Case and its clear mistake rule would
bind future Article 9 disputes, SCJ and the lower courts distinguished those
cases from the Tomabechi Case. For cases that threatened to unleash an
Article 9 issue, especially those challenging the constitutionality of Anpo
and retaining U.S. forces in Japan, the application of the Sunagawa Case
political question doctrine is binding. 82 In short, a dual standard for political
73

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 8, 1960, 14 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] (7)
1206 (Japan).
74
KENPŌ, art. 7, para. 1 (stating, “The Emperor, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, shall
perform the following acts in matters of state on behalf of the people . . . Dissolution of the House of
Representatives.”).
75
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 8, 1960, 14 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 7,
1206 (Japan).
76
Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Oct. 19, 1953, Sho 27 no. 156, 14 KAKYŪ SAIBANSHO
KEIJI SAIBAN REISŪ [KAKEISHŪ] 7, 1251 (Japan).
77
Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High. Ct.] Sep. 22, 1954, Sho 27 no. 2010, 14 KŌTŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [KOMINSHŪ] 7, 1265 (Japan).
78
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 8, 1960, 7, 14 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
1206 (Japan).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Motoaki Hatake, supra note 52, at 94–95.
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questions analysis bore over the lower courts.83 First, the Sunagawa Case’s
clear mistake rule prevailed in Article 9 disputes including challenges to
Anpo and stationing of U.S. forces. 84 Second, other disputes of high
political consideration, such as the mutual relations between the political
branches seen in the Tomabechi Case, are categorically precluded from
judicial review.85
Since the Sunagawa Case, SCJ has further split Article 9 disputes by
subject matter. First, on Anpo and the stationing of U.S. forces disputes,
SCJ affirmed the Sunagawa Case as binding precedent. SCJ cited the
Sunagawa Case and adopted the political question doctrine and clear
mistake rule, while refraining from ruling on the merits in the 1969
Zenshihosendai Case,86 and the 1996 Okinawa Mandamus Case.87 As for
disputes regarding SDF and its military base, while SCJ refrained from
stepping in on the 1982 Naganuma Case88 and the 1989 Hyakuri Air Base
83
MASAYUKI ATARASHI, KENPŌ SOSHŌ-RON [CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] (377–381) (2d ed.
2010); Masaomi Kimizuka, Tochi Koi-Ron Saikō —Aru Ga Nai [Reconsidering Political Question Doctrine
—To Be or Not to Be], 22 YOKOHAMA L. REV. 33 (2013).
84
Motoaki Hatake, supra note 52,
85
Id.
86
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1969, 5, 23 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 685
(Japan) The defendants were employees in court and participated in a political strike against Anpo. The
defendants were accused of violating National Public Service Law Article 98, paragraph 5 and article 110,
paragraph 1, item 17, which imposed criminal liability on public officials involving in “striking, engaging
in delaying acts or other acts of dispute, or from resorting to delaying tactics which reduce the efficiency of
governmental operations, against the public as employer represented by the Government.” These
defendants were guilty in district court and high court. SCJ dismissed the appeal. As for the dispute
concerning the constitutionality of Anpo, SCJ cited the Sunagawa Case as precedent, indicating “the Court
should consider Anpo disputes prudentially because of their highly political considerations,” and holding
the new Anpo was “not obviously unconstitutional and void,” and thus outside the scope of judicial review.
87
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug. 28, 1996, 7, 50, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
1952 (Japan) (After the 1995 Okinawa rape incident, Okinawan residents were furious with U.S. military
forces. Land owners rejected to renew their land lease where the U.S. forces bases were built. Based on
Articles 3 & 14 of the Special Measures Concerning Land for U.S. Armed Forces Law and Article 36,
paragraph 5 of the Land Expropriation Law, the governor incurred a duty to proxy sign the lease extension.
But the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, Masahide Ota, refused to do so. SCJ unanimously ruled the
Japanese central government has authority to so act. As for the dispute about the Japan–U.S. Security
Treaty, SCJ formally cited the Sunagawa Case and ruled, “unless the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and the
Agreement on the Status of U.S. Armed Forces are obviously unconstitutional and void, the courts should
examine
whether
the
Special
Measures
concerning
Land
for
U.S.
Armed Forces Law is constitutional or not on the premise that the treaties are constitutional.”), http://www.
courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=268; see also Nicholas D. Kristof, Japanese Court Rules Government
Can Seize Land for U.S. Bases, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 29, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/29/world/jap
anese-court-rules-government-can-seize-land-for-us-bases.html.
88
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 9, 1982, 9, 36 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
1679 (Japan). In the Naganuma Case, the Sapporo District Court declined to apply the Sunagawa Case
precedent, and ruled, the SDF constituted land, sea and air forces, in violation of Article 9, paragraph 2. See
Sapporo Chiho Saibansho [Sapporo Dist. Ct.] Sept. 7, 1973, 712 HANREI JIHO [HANJI] 24 (Japan). The
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Case, 89 the lower courts were divided between the political question
doctrine,90 constitutional avoidance,91 and striking down the SDF.92
D.

The Jurisprudence of Judicial Review and the Political
Question Doctrine in Japan

Most Japanese constitutional scholars approved of SCJ’s application
of the political question doctrine in the Sunagawa Case utilizing three main
rationales: the prudential view, 93 judicial competency, 94 and separation of
powers.95

Sapporo High Court, discussed the Sunagawa political question doctrine, but ultimately decided the case on
the basis of standing, another obstacle to judicial review. See Sapporo Koto Saibansho [Sapporo High. Ct.]
Aug. 5, 1976, 821 HANREI JIHO [HANJI] 21 (Japan). The SCJ affirmed and rejected to review on the basis of
lacking interests in case. See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 9, 1982, 9, 36 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1679 (Japan).
89
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 20, 1989, 6, 43 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
385 (Japan) The issue in dispute was whether selling properties to the SDF was a violation of KENPŌ
Article 9, and therefore grounds for rescission. The district court adopted the political question doctrine
and clear mistake rule, and rejected ruling the SDF unconstitutional. The high court dismissed the appeal
and ruled the SDF was neither antisocial nor against the public morality. As a result, there was no cause
for rescinding the sale. SCJ dismissed the appeal because “Article 9 is not applicable to actions of private
parties.” See GOODMAN, supra note 55, at 227.
90
The appellate court in the Naganuma Case (Sapporo Kōtō Saibansho [Sapporo High. Ct.] Aug. 5,
1976, no. 821, 21 HANREI JIHO [HANJI] (Japan)), the district court in the Hyakuri Air Base (Mitoshi Chiho
Saibansho [Mitoshi Dist. Ct.] Feb 17, 1977, no. 872, 22 HANREI JIHO [HANJI] (Japan)) and appellate court
in the Atsugi Air Base (Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High. Ct.] Apr. 9, 1986, no. 1192, 1 HANREI JIHO
[HANJI] (Japan)), adopted the political question doctrine and rejected an Article 9 argument challenging the
legitimacy of SDF.
91
The district court in the Eniwa Case. (The defendant, accused of cutting the phone lines of an SDF
facility, was indicted by the Special Criminal Law, incriminating the act of destroying materials serving
defensive purposes. The court held that the phone lines were not used for defense purposes and granted
acquittal.) See also Sapporo Chiho Saibansho [Sapporo Dist. Ct.] Mar. 29, 1967, 3, 9 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 359 (Japan).
92
The district court in the Naganuma Case. See Sapporo Chiho Saibansho [Sapporo Dist. Ct.] Sept.
7, 1973, 712 24, HANREI JIHO [HANJI] (Japan), translation is available in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI
ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL C ASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 83 (1996).
93
Junjiro Yamada, Tōchi kōi ni tsuite [The Political Question Doctrine], 13 KŌHŌ KENKYŪ 160
(1955); HIDENORI TOMATSU, PUREPPU KENPŌ [PREP. CONSTITUTION] 135 (2007); NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE,
KENPŌ SOSHO RIRON [THE THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] 428 (1973) [hereinafter KENPŌ
SOSHO RIRON].
94
Hiroshi Hokama, Tochi koi ni tsuite [The Political Question Doctrine], 41 KOHO KENKYU 200
(1979).
95
Ogawa Ichiro, Tochi koi-ron [The Political Question Doctrine], GYOSEIHORI 119 (1986); Hiroshi
Kaneko, Tochi koi no kenkyu [Research on the Political Question Doctrine], 72 KOKKAGAKKAI ZASSHI (9)
1, 4 (1958); Toshio Irie, Tōchi kōi [The political question doctrine], 13 KOHO KENKYU 75, 90 (1955)
[hereinafter Toshio Irie]; Tatsuhiko Yamamoto, Kokumin shuken to tōchi kōi [Popular Sovereignty and
Political Question Doctrine], 729 HORITSU SEMINA 50 (Oct. 2015) (Professor Yamamoto and Justice Irie
emphasized the rationale of popular sovereignty and political accountability to justify judicial restraint. But
they seemed to overlook the issue of whether the Japanese electoral system, campaign strategies, and Diet
are capable of reflecting the true voice of the Japanese people. See REIN TAAGEPERA & MATTHEW SOBERG
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Prudential view scholars 96 argue the political question doctrine is a
political custom rather than a legal theory. 97 Scholar Junjiro Yamada asserts
the political question doctrine possesses characteristics of law and politics,
yet is still within the scope of judicial examination. 98 However, Yamada
acknowledges the judiciary must exercise restraint and analyze both costs
and benefits, and the likelihood of chaos a decision might entail when
deciding whether to rule. 99 Aligning with the prudential view, scholar
Nobuyoshi Ashibe favors a balancing test that considers the necessity of the
protection of human rights, the political consequences of a decision, the risk
of politicizing the judiciary, the limits of judicial competency, and the
probability of enforcement.100 However, the prudential view draws criticism
for failing to render clear guidance for drawing the boundary of judicial
review in practice.101
Other scholars agreed on the necessity of judicial restraint while
focusing on the rationale of judicial competency. 102 Under the influence of
U.S. jurisprudence emphasizing judicial “passive virtues” and arguing for
the importance of prudential considerations, these scholars pay close
attention to judicially discoverable and manageable standards.103 Assessing
judicial competency through this lens, these scholars mainly agree that the
Sunagawa Case’s clear mistake rule is appropriate.104
The third rationale, separation of powers, has been adopted by many
Japanese scholars. 105 Scholar Hiroshi Kaneko and Justice Irie argue that
SHUGART, SEATS A VOTES: THE EFFECTS AND DETERMINATION OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 77–81 (1989));
ELLIS KRAUSS AND ROBBERT J. PEKKANEN, THE RISE AND FALL OF J APAN'S LDP: POLITICAL PARTY
ORGANIZATIONS AS HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONS 100, 128 (2011).
96
See Kineko Kubota, Amerika kenpō ni okeru seijimondai [Political Questions in the U.S.
Constitution], 13 KOHO KENKYU [Public Law Research] 168, 173 (1955); Masami Ito, KENPŌ [THE
CONSTITUTION] 636 (3d ed. 1995); Akira Nishio, Tōchi kōi ni tsuite [About Political Question Doctrine], 5
DOSHISHA HOGAKU, 113 (1976).
97
HIDENORI TOMATSU, supra note 93, at 135; HIDENORI TOMATSU, SHIHŌ SHINSA-SEI [THE
JUDICIAL REVIEW SYSTEM] 171 (1989).
98
Junjiro Yamada, supra note 93, at 108.
99
Id. at 78, 85.
100
NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, supra note 93, at 428; NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, supra note 55, at 137.
101
MASANARI SAKAMOTO, KENPŌ RIRON I [CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY I] 426 (3d ed. 2000); Toyoji
Kakudo, Tōchi Kōi [Political Question Doctrine], 638 JURIST 176 (1977).
102
Hiroshi Hokama, Tōchi kōi ni tsuite [About the Political Question Doctrine], 41 KŌHŌ KENKYŪ
200 (1979).
103
KŌJI SATŌ, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 357 (1995).
104
YŌICHI HIGUCHI, KENPŌ IV [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IV] 150 (2004).
105
ISAO SATŌ, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ GAISETSU [OUTLINE OF THE C ONSTITUTION OF J APAN] 477 (5th ed.
1996); KAZUHIRO NAGAO, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN] 243 (4th ed. 2011).
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because the Kenpō designates a democratic government, the people must
ultimately speak on issues of high political consideration and maintain
control of the political branches. 106 This formulation of separation of
powers is coupled with the concept of popular sovereignty and commits
political matters to the political branches rather than the unelected judicial
branch, distinguishing it from its U.S. counterpart which emphasizes
constitutional structure and grants of power.107
Opposing the consensus among most scholars that the Japanese
political question doctrine is legitimate, scholars Tatsugorō Isozaki 108 and
Yasuo Sugihara 109 strictly adhere to the Kenpō’s text and argue for
constitutional supremacy. 110 Article 81 unequivocally names SCJ the court
of last resort to determine constitutionality in all disputes, distinguishing it
from the U.S. Constitution. 111 Analyzing the Kenpō’s unique structure and
text, these scholars argue that the U.S. political question doctrine is a poor
tool for interpreting the Kenpō. 112 To the extent the political question
doctrine has a constitutional rationale, it supports strong judicial review
because the framers expressly vested final interpretive power of the Kenpō
with SCJ rather than the people.113 The scholar Setsu Kobayashi adds an
originalist argument, observing that prior to World War II, the political
branches wielded final decision-making power and proceeded to eviscerate
the Meiji Constitution. To Kobayashi, this historical lesson underpins the
collective intent of the Kenpō’s framers to have an independent judiciary and
a functioning system of checks and balances. Kobayashi argues that a
political question doctrine that narrows judicial review is inconsistent with
the Kenpō framers’ intent.114
While SCJ adopted its political question doctrine based on separation
of powers and prudential rationales with few other developments, the U.S.
106

Toshio Irie, supra note 95, at 91 (Justice Irie conceded that the best way to accomplish political
accountability is via public referendum and the general election is an alternative when the public
referendum has not yet been established); Hiroshi Kaneko, supra note 95, at 1, 4.
107
Toshio Irie, supra note 95, at 91; Hiroshi Kaneko, supra note 95, at 1, 4.
108
Tatsugorō Isozaki, Iwayuru tōchi kōi to waga kuni kenpō [The Political Question Doctrine and the
Japanese Constitution], 39 MINSHŌHŌ ZASSHI 867, 871–72 (1959).
109
YASUO SUGIHARA, KENPŌ II [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II] 372 (1989).
110
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 98, para. 1 (“This Constitution shall be the
supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part
thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity.”).
111
Tatsugorō Isozaki, supra note 108, at 871–72.
112
Yasuhiro Okudaira, supra note 22, at 70; SETSU KOBAYASHI, supra note 46, at139–41.
113
Tatsugorō Isozaki, supra note 71, at 27.
114
SETSU KOBAYASHI, supra note 46, at 141 (reasoning that compromised judicial power is
inconsistent with the framers’ intent).
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political question doctrine evolved in phases leading up to the 1962
landmark case Baker v. Carr in which it was restated.115 Before discussing
how SCJ may adopt lessons from the U.S. in its approach to the 2014
reinterpretation controversy, an overview of judicial review and the political
question doctrine in the U.S. Supreme Court is in order.
II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
U.S. SUPREME COURT

THE

POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

IN THE

The U.S. acted as transplant donor for judicial review in Japan and
may similarly serve as a useful model for developing Japan’s political
question doctrine. Reviewing the evolution of judicial review in the U.S.
Supreme Court will provide a basis for competing views of its political
question doctrine. Corresponding to the development of the judicial review,
this part analyzes the trend of the U.S. political question doctrine and its
jurisprudential changes.
A.

The Origin of Judicial Review in the U.S. Supreme Court

Ratified in 1788, the U.S. Constitution omits any express grant of
judicial review to the Supreme Court. 116 Its text develops little about the
Supreme Court, inviting over two centuries of argument over the Court’s
proper role.117 The 1803 case Marbury v. Madison is commonly viewed as
the first time the U.S. Supreme Court exercised judicial review to declare an
act of Congress unconstitutional. 118
Chief Justice John Marshall
emphasized, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial
Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two laws
conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each.”119
115

Zachary Baron Shemtob, The Political Question Doctrines: Zivotofsky v. Clinton and Getting
Beyond the Textual—Prudential Paradigm, 104 GEO. L. J. 1001, 1007 (2016); Larry D. Kramer, Judicial
Supremacy and the End of Judicial Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 621, 625–31 (2012).
116
Compare U.S. CONST. art. III (omitting a judicial review provision), with NIHONKOKU KENPŌ
[KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81, para. 1 (granting this power expressly to the SCJ).
117
See CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION TO J UDGE-M ADE LAW 3–10 (rev. ed. 1994).
118
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175–78 (1803); see also Yasuo Hasebe, Constitutional
Applications of the Supreme Court of Japan, in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: FUNCTION, IMPACT, AND
CHALLENGES 237, 237 (2016); But cf. Norikazu Kawagishi, The Birth of Judicial Review in Japan, 5 INT’L
J. CONST. L. 308, 330 (2007), http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/308.full (describing the 1948
Placard Case, in which SCJ declined to rule on the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing criticism of
the Emperor, instead dismissing an appeal of conviction on a technicality).
119
Marbury, at 177.
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Ever since, the Supreme Court retained the power to declare a law
unconstitutional.120
B.

Three Views on the Role of Judicial Review in the Supreme
Court

Observing judicial review’s uneven history in the U.S., three main
schools of thought developed characterizing its proper level of activity. 121
The “classical theory” emphasizes judicial restraint based on popular
sovereignty and prioritizes the politically elected branches. 122 “Passive
virtues” emphasize prudential considerations in selecting cases with an eye
toward maintaining legitimacy with the public. 123 Finally, proponents of
robust judicial review emphasize the Constitution as the supreme law of the
land that must supersede conflicting laws.124
1.

The Classical Theory and the Rule of the Clear Mistake

The “classical theory” of judicial review emphasizes the Court’s
unelected status as a reason for it to be highly deferential and to let
reasonable acts of Congress stand. 125 In 1893, scholar James Bradley
Thayer recommended that courts “can only disregard [an] Act [of Congress]
when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a
mistake, but have made a very clear one, — so clear that it is not open to
rational question.”126 Thayer cautions that they must not “step into the shoes
of the law-maker.”127 In this view, a “distinction between what is merely
incorrect and what is unreasonable” must be recognized.128 The classical
theory and Thayer’s “rule of the clear mistake” fell out of favor with an
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ascendant Warren Court in the 1960s, and has yet to regain a foothold in
Supreme Court jurisprudence.129
2.

The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty and Prudential
Factors

Alternatives to the strict classical theory emerged as civil rights issues
fueled more active judicial review in the Warren Court.130 However, judicial
review is suspect because when the Supreme Court strikes down a law, it
“exercises control, not on behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it.”131
Scholar Alexander Bickel argued for limited yet authoritative use of judicial
review to address this “counter-majoritarian difficulty” wherein unelected
officials make final decisions overturning the elected branches. 132 Bickel
contends the judiciary should avoid deciding controversies when judges lack
knowledge or expertise, political backlash from the public is likely, and
when the Court might invite conflicts with another branch. 133 Bickel’s
passive virtues may best be characterized in Supreme Court jurisprudence by
Justice Louis Brandeis’ 1936 concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority.134 Justice Brandeis lays out prudential rules for deciding
when to exercise judicial review that are not found in the Constitution’s
text.135 Bickel believed that regularly exercising passive virtues to dodge
controversial decisions builds the Court’s legitimacy with the public. 136
3.

Robust Judicial Review

Comparatively, proponents of robust judicial review contend the
Supreme Court legitimately claims the final say on constitutional
interpretation and fulfills its proper role when deciding controversial
issues. 137 Robust judicial review embraces the Court’s role as a policymaking body because the political branches historically have failed to
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vindicate minority rights.138 In 1959, scholar Herbert Weschler formulated a
version of robust judicial review wherein, “courts have both the title and the
duty. . . to review the actions of the other branches in the light of
constitutional provisions, even though the action involves value choices.”139
In 1968, scholar Archibald Cox approvingly wrote, “[j]udges do make law,
they have no choice but to make law, their law making is and should be a
reflection of their views on public policy.”140 A Supreme Court exercising
robust judicial review is confident in its role as policymaker, aptly
describing the Court’s general temperament since the Warren Court.141
C.

Political Question Doctrine Jurisprudence in the U.S. Supreme
Court

With the differing rationales of the competing schools of thought
regarding the role of judicial review in mind, we turn to the application of
the political question doctrine in the U.S. 142 The political question doctrine
precludes entire subject areas from being decided on the merits despite a
case satisfying all other tests of justiciability, such as standing, mootness,
and ripeness.143 This method of avoiding controversial rulings is considered
a rule of judicial restraint rather than procedure, 144 based on two ideas: (1)
the Constitution grants the political branches certain powers the Court
cannot question; and (2) the political branches are best equipped to remedy
particular issues.145
1.

The Classical Political Question Doctrine

The origin of the political question doctrine in the U.S. Supreme
Court can be traced to Marbury, applied narrowly when the Constitution
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expressly vests plenary power with the president.146 Chief Justice Marshall
held that certain executive actions are not subject to judicial review because:
[W]here the heads of departments . . . act in cases in which the
executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing
can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only
politically examinable. . . .The province of the court is, solely,
to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the
executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they
have discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive,
can never be made in this court.147
This formulation became known as the “classical political question
doctrine” and is closely tied to the Constitution’s text. 148 Under this
doctrine, controversial issues are categorically excluded from justiciability
when the Constitution vests plenary discretion with the President such as in
foreign affairs—but not to vindicate individual rights. 149 Marshall’s
classical doctrine was limited by a textual constitutional grant of power in
specified areas of policy. 150 U.S. scholars acknowledge the classical
political question doctrine to employ a separation of powers rationale. 151
2.

The Rise and Fall of the Prudential Political Question
Doctrine

After Marbury, the textual scope of political questions gradually came
to include prudential factors.152 Prudential factors are various, including the
sensitivity of involved national interests, and whether there are clearly
established legal standards for the issue.153 Prudential factors first emerged
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alongside the classical doctrine in the 1849 case Luther v. Borden.154
Court deferred to Congress advancing two main rationales: (1)
legislative branch possesses sole constitutional authority to decide
matter; and (2) “prudential considerations,” including the likely chaos
would result from a decision. 155

The
the
this
that

The first half of the Twentieth Century saw the Supreme Court
demure on political representation cases. 156 In 1912, the Court elevated
prudential considerations in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Oregon, relying on the far-reaching effects of a decision more than on
constitutional text and structure.157 The Court conceded the “great variety of
relevant conditions, political, social and economic” put it out of its depth and
decided it could not distill a standard, holding, “the lack of criteria for a
judicial determination” is a “dominant consideration” in deciding whether an
issue is a political question. 158 The Court introduced the judiciary’s limited
institutional capacity as a prudential factor in the 1946 congressional
redistricting case Colegrove v. Green. 159 Colegrove was an electoral
malapportionment case in which rural individuals were vastly
overrepresented.160 Justice Frankfurter’s plurality insisted the Court should
opt “not to enter th[e] political thicket,” and designated the redrawing of
congressional districts as outside the Court’s competence. 161 Justice
Frankfurter notes Congress’s express constitutional power to regulate the
type of election at issue in Colegrove, and his judgment turns on the
prudential consideration of the Court’s inability to remedy the injury at
issue.162
3.

Baker v. Carr: Reframing the Political Question Doctrine

In 1962, the Supreme Court dramatically reformulated the political
154

Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 10 (1849) (deciding that whether a State has exercised proper
maintenance of “a republican form of government” as required by the Constitution is a question left to
Congress).
155
Id.; COLE, supra note 149, at 4 (the issue in Luther v. Borden asked the Court to determine the
legitimate government of a sovereign state, likely to result in chaos if decided).
156
COLE, supra note 149, at 4.
157
Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 141–42 (1912) (holding that whether the state
of Oregon’s initiative and referendum system was consistent with the Constitution’s “republican form of
government” Guaranty Clause requirement is a political question).
158
Id. at 453–55.
159
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
160
Id. at 550–51; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 142 (explaining Frankfurter’s plurality opinion).
161
Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556.
162
Barkow, supra note 146, at 239 (explaining Frankfurter’s plurality opinion, stating the Court had
no ability to remedy voter dilution relative to Congress.).

April 2017

Can the Japanese Supreme Court Overcome the Political Question Hurdle?

question doctrine in Baker v. Carr. 163 Though Colegrove found that
apportionment of state congressional voting districts is a political question,
the Court found in Baker that a similar issue, framed differently, was not a
political question.164 Baker reinforced that the political question doctrine is
“primarily a function of the separation of powers.” 165 Justice Brennan’s
majority opinion lays out a six-factor test to help guide the Court in making
the determination, examining whether there is:
[1] [a] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4]
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.166
In Baker, Brennan attempted to craft, for the first time, a unified
political question doctrine. 167 The first factor focuses on the constitutional
text granting other branches specific powers the judiciary may not question,
as in Luther.168 The second factor is primarily structural and alludes to the
competencies of the other branches, as in Coleman.169 The final four factors
are prudential considerations, cautioning against an unelected court tackling
highly political issues.170
D.

The Political Question Doctrine After Baker

After Baker, the Supreme Court narrowed the influence of prudential
factors in political questions analysis. 171 In more contemporary analyses,
163
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prudential factors are rarer, despite the Baker test officially endorsing
them.172 While the Baker test includes both textual and prudential factors,
the balance between them remained a puzzle for over fifty years.173 The
treatment of the political question doctrine itself has likewise narrowed in
applicable scope since Baker. 174 Between the 1962 Baker decision and
2016, the Supreme Court discussed the political question doctrine in thirtyeight cases, finding a nonjusticiable political question only twice.175 In Bush
v. Gore (2000), the Court’s decision determined the outcome of a
presidential election. 176 Justice Breyer’s Bush v. Gore dissent embraced
Frankfurter and Bickel’s prudential analysis and passive virtues, arguing that
the case’s political nature made it nonjusticiable.177 Bickel’s passive virtues,
to be deployed when a case threatens the Court’s legitimacy with the public,
were laid to rest in Bush v. Gore, and have yet to be revived.178
Since John Roberts was seated as Chief Justice in 2005, the Court has
yet to find a political question. The Roberts Court notably found no political
question and ignored Baker’s prudential factors in the 2012 case Zivotofsky
v. Clinton, deciding that whether an individual has the right to have
“Jerusalem, Israel” listed as a place of birth on a passport when the State
Department took no stance on Jerusalem’s political status, was not a political
question. 179 In Zivotofsky, the Roberts majority held that the political
question doctrine is a “narrow exception” to the general rule that “the
Judiciary has the responsibility to decide cases properly before it.”180 The
Court relied on the first two Baker factors only and held a political question
exists “where there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
question); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (relegating consideration of prudential factors to
concurring opinions, and not as part of central holding); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)
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the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”181 The majority’s
conspicuous omission of Baker’s prudential factors sparked debate over the
Baker test’s viability going forward.182
As robust judicial review ascended in the U.S. Supreme Court, the
political question doctrine receded. The political question doctrine may yet
again transform after Zivotofsky, but the Court’s turn toward a textual and
structural focus is significant. 183 In the four most recent cases that
considered finding a political question, appeals to text and structure
dominated and prudential considerations were relegated concurrences or
dissents.184 The judicial restraint of Thayer and Bickel, and the importance
of prudential considerations in political questions analysis have been mostly
cast aside.185 The Zivotofsky majority’s exclusive focus on text and structure
throws the future prudential factors into doubt. 186 The jurisprudential
changes that have shaped the political question doctrine in the U.S. Supreme
Court from Baker to Zivotofsky present a model SCJ might consider when in
its approach the 2014 reinterpretation.
III.

THE SCJ COULD RESTATE AND CLARIFY ITS POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE AND REEXAMINE ITS APPLICATION

Developments in the U.S. political question doctrine can act as a
guide to SCJ as it navigates the complex and unique context of Kenpō
Article 9 disputes in this critical moment. We recommend that SCJ restate
and clarify its political question doctrine. We also recommend that SCJ
consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s adoption of robust judicial review and its
political questions development from Baker through Zivotofsky. These
recommendations stem from our analysis that SCJ has undervalued the text
history, and checks and balances of the Kenpō, and overemphasized
prudential consideration in its political questions analysis.187 The benefits of
181
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our approach are two-fold. First, because finding a political question
precludes judicial review, a clarified political question doctrine will help to
restore judicial checks and balances on the executive. Second, we believe a
more active SCJ can encourage a deep dialogue between the government and
the people to deliberate national security strategies and move Japan forward.
A.

Clarifying the SCJ Political Question Doctrine

We recommend SCJ clarify the political question doctrine by restating
it in a judicial opinion that includes: 1) elaborating the role separation of
powers plays in political questions analysis; 2) determining what, if any,
relation the clear mistake rule bears to the political question doctrine; and 3)
consideration of the weight SCJ will give to the Kenpō’s text, history, and
structure when determining whether a political question exists. This
restatement will align the Japanese political question doctrine with the
Kenpō’s text and structure as the U.S. Supreme Court did in its treatment of
Baker in Zivotofsky.
1.

Elaborating the Spirit of Separation of Powers: Checks
and Balances

First, SCJ can begin restating its political question doctrine by
clarifying the role of separation of powers. Clarifying separation of powers
includes SCJ defining its own role as constitutional interpreter, defining
when another branch is constitutionally empowered to act, and addressing
the checks and balances interplay between them. The first power SCJ
should define is its own judicial review power under Article 81. In the U.S.,
the political question doctrine primarily operates as a function of separation
of powers, not as a political confrontation escape pod. 188 Article 81
expressly grants SCJ the power of interpreting the Kenpō. 189 The War
Potential Clause prohibits maintaining war potential.190 Nowhere does the
Kenpō provide that executive power regarding foreign as well as national
security policy and treaties is immune from judicial review. Yet in the
Sunagawa Case, SCJ cites “an extremely high degree of political
consideration” as a valid reason not to rule on the merits.191 The Kenpō’s
history shows it was designed to vest judicial review with SCJ, the framers’
188
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chosen final interpreter.192
Next in its separation of powers clarification, SCJ should define the
constitutional powers of the other branches in a given arena. Deference for
the sake of political stability that does not identify the branch empowered by
the Kenpō to make final decisions on a given issue weakens separation of
powers analysis. In the Sunagawa Case, SCJ announced it would defer to
the political branches as long as the act is “not obviously unconstitutional
and void.” 193 The Sunagawa Case has been regarded as a precedent
effectively precluding SCJ and lower courts from hearing disputes regarding
Anpo and the stationing of U.S. Forces. We have examined the U.S.
Supreme Court examples of Marbury and Zivotofsky, discussing when a
constitutional provision empowers the executive to act; this is an appropriate
place to begin political questions analysis. Baker and Zivotofsky affirm the
political question doctrine is primarily a function of separation of powers.
This example can be useful to SCJ because defining the powers of each
branch helps clarify when the judicial branch encounters a political question
that lies outside its power of judicial review.
After defining its own power and that of the separate branches, SCJ
should then identify the checks and balances between them. SCJ employed
the separation of powers rationale in the Tomabechi Case, designating
relations between the political branches as outside the scope of judicial
review. But SCJ has not identified the role of checks and balances between
the branches. A focus on highly politicized issues instead of checks and
balances as determined by the Kenpō should be reconsidered. Eviscerating
checks and balances will block the flow of dialogue among the three
branches, and between the government and the people. While SCJ is under
no obligation to adopt the U.S. version of political questions, the doctrine’s
driving force, checks and balances, is baked into both the Kenpō and U.S.
Constitution, and is a principle worth clarifying.
2.

Clarifying the Clear Mistake Rule’s Relationship to
Political Questions

Second in its political questions restatement, SCJ should clarify the
192
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relationship between the political question doctrine and the clear mistake
rule. SCJ’s Article 9 jurisprudence would benefit from severing the clear
mistake rule from the political question doctrine. The Sunagawa Case’s
clear mistake rule precedent, cited in the Zeshihosendai Case and the
Okinawa Mandamus Case, has entrenched the clear mistake rule in Article 9
jurisprudence on the Anpo and stationing of U.S. troops issues. There is no
analogue in modern U.S. Supreme Court political questions jurisprudence,
where the clarity required has trended toward which branches is
constitutionally authorized to act. Because the U.S. clear mistake rule as
formulated by Thayer does not place subject matter off limits and its
political question doctrine does, SCJ’s potent combination of the two in the
Sunagawa Case demands clarification on their relationship. In the U.S.
Supreme Court, if a political branch is acting without express constitutional
authority, the Court is capable of deciding the case, and prudential factors
weigh in favor of a decision, then the mistake’s degree of clarity is
inapposite. SCJ may clarify that the clear mistake rule’s application to
Article 9 cases is in fact not political questions analysis. Such clarification
would at least uncouple these potent barriers to judicial review.
3.

Weighing Text
Considerations

and

History

Against

Prudential

Third, SCJ’s political questions opinion should consider the weight
given to textual and historical factors in political question analysis. There is
no question that some prudential factors, particularly the likelihood of
resulting chaos and potential inconsistent declarations from another branch,
are potentially important to SCJ. 194 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
provides a model where prudential factors do not predominate over the
textual and structural factors. While the prudential consideration seems still
influential in Article 9 cases,195 the U.S. Supreme Court has shown political
questions jurisprudence can shift away from prudential factors in stages.
Prudential considerations were four of six of factors announced in the Baker
test, yet had vanished from the Court’s analysis in Zivotofsky. The Court’s
emphasis on checks and balances may have helped facilitate the Zivotofsky
shift.
The SCJ is not bound by prudential considerations and retains a plain
text and rich history that would support a shift away from them. If SCJ were
194
195
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to consider the historical drafting process of Article 81, this history would
provide strong support for a textual and historical restatement of the political
question doctrine. This history strongly suggests SCJ was intended to
decide controversial cases and has been almost completely ignored in SCJ
analysis. Article 81 designates SCJ the “court of last resort” and may choose
whether textual and historical considerations are dominant or prudential
considerations are dominant. While declaring either as dominant in a
judicial opinion will clarify this issue, anointing textual and historical factors
as dominant will allow SCJ to unleash the unusual history of judicial
review’s establishment in Japan to bolster its credibility as final interpreter
of the Kenpō.
Japanese prudential view scholars might argue that judicial
determination of political disputes regarding Article 9 threaten to damage
the judiciary’s legitimacy with the public and draw indifference from the
political branches. However, we believe this is worth the risk for three
reasons. First, these concerns might be mere speculation lacking solid
ground that result in judicial abdication and causing more serious chaos and
instability. Second, public reliance on the judicial branch should be based
on sound, convincing, reasoning of the decision, rather than judicial
abdication. Third, the legal effect of a hypothetical 2014 Reinterpretation
decision would merely be bound to that specific case, rather than imposing
general effects.
Clarifying and restating a political questions test that includes discussion
of separation of powers and the clear mistake rule, and also considers how it
wishes to weigh textual and historical versus prudential factors will help
provide guidance for future political questions cases. Applying a test that
focuses on specific provisions of the Kenpō to both Article 9 cases is an
important step in removing the political questions barrier.
B.

Reexamining the Political Question Doctrine in Light of U.S.
Political Question Developments

We also suggest SCJ may benefit from observing post-Baker
developments of political questions jurisprudence in the U.S. Supreme
Court. SCJ may benefit by: 1) considering adopting a new political
questions test aligning with the U.S. Supreme Court’s post-Baker
developments; and 2) considering hearing a challenge to the 2014
reinterpretation to develop a new test.
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First, SCJ may examine U.S. political questions jurisprudence from
Baker through Zivotofsky to get a sense of what action fits its goals.
Observing the way the Zivotofsky Court took the unranked Baker factors and
favored text as opposed to prudential factors could lead to strategic insights
on the weight of Kenpō’s text and structure. It was unclear for many years
after Baker how the balance between textual and prudential factors would
play out. Its multi-factor test allows the Court to determine the weight of the
factors, either by express announcement, or in subsequent interpretation.
While prudential considerations will always necessarily depend on the
circumstances, the text and history of the Kenpō will always be available to
anchor a political questions opinion. As a preliminary step, these factors
could find their way into a restated political questions standard. A carefully
chosen and clearly stated test can help clear the political questions hurdle to
hear a challenge to the 2014 CLB reinterpretation, or to subsequent Article 9
controversies.
Second, in order to move toward fulfilling its designed institutional
function as final interpreter of the Kenpō, SCJ may decide to hear an Article
9 challenge to the 2014 CLB reinterpretation. Baker itself did not decide the
substantive issue when it announced its political questions test. 196 SCJ can
hear a 2014 reinterpretation challenge in order to equip itself with a clarified
and unified restatement of the political question doctrine. This will help
facilitate a constructive dialogue between the government and the people. In
doing so, it may seek to develop its own navigable and manageable political
questions test to achieve political stability in the modern day.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the seventy years since the 1947 transplant of judicial review from
the U.S. into Japan, SCJ has referenced foreign judicial experience and built
its own model of the political question doctrine. 197 SCJ, like the U.S.
Supreme Court, struggled with the issues of the counter-majoritarian
difficulty and drawing the boundary of judicial review to balance power with
the political branches.
In this comment, we argue that under the Kenpō’s text, its framers’
intent, and the Court’s institutional function, SCJ could play an active role as
final interpreter of the Kenpō and offer solid guidance to settle the political
196
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KISABURO YOKOTA, IKEN SHINSA [THE JUDICIAL REVIEW] (1968).
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instability brought on by Article 9 controversies. The Kenpō’s text and
institutional function designate the Kenpō the supreme law of Japan, and
textually grant SCJ the power to be its final interpreter. 198 The framers,
including Japanese scholars on the Matsumoto Committee, politicians, and
the experts within the GS and SCAP, all agreed on adopting judicial review
without restriction and without interference from the Diet.
One major obstacle to clarifying the effect of the 2014 reinterpretation
on Article 9 is the 1959 Sunagawa Case’s political questions precedent. In
subsequent cases, SCJ has undervalued the Kenpō’s text and history and
overvalued other factors. Political questions jurisprudence in the U.S.
Supreme Court could help provide an example to narrow the political
question doctrine. Restating a standard that clarifies the separation of
powers including checks and balances, the clear mistake rule’s role, and
strategically considers textual and historical factors will represent an
important first step. Announcing this standard after hearing a challenge to
the 2014 Reinterpretation with an understanding of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s political questions experience to balance the factors of history, text
and judicial prudence after Baker is another step toward clearing the political
questions hurdle. And we sincerely believe a more active SCJ can encourage
a deep dialogue between the government and the people to form a new
consensus on its national security strategies and move Japan forward.
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